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Taking Her Name: 
On Queer Male “Woman-Identification” and Feminist Theory 
 
By A. Loudermilki 
 
For several years I’ve wanted to return to a naive but earnest essay—about the position of 
the “woman-identified male” in feminism—that constituted my final project for a Women’s 
Studies course called Philosophical Perspectives of Women. The year was 1989, and I was a 
sophomore English major, one of two males in the class. This essay, like that one, will bring 
together the personal and the theoretical, but now, in hindsight and with the horizon still shifting, 
feminist theory seems as fluid as “the personal,” as the daily lives from out of which theory 
speaks and to which theory speaks.    
This essay challenges my original argument for “woman-identified male” as an identity 
category. I do not seek to disavow what anyone might claim or name as a lived experience, but to 
focus, instead, on my own act of claiming and the name I gave my experience. Reading over the 
original essay, I am surprised that I wasn’t more blind-spotted or defensive. What strikes me as 
the essay’s primary essentialism is my consistent deferral to what I perceived as the more 
authentic experience of the biological female as a culturally-constructed woman.  
While everywhere I went, I was assumed to be female, “mistaken” for a woman.  
I wasn’t trying to pass as a woman but when I didn’t pass it became an issue of not 
passing. I wore thrift shop clothes and junk-store jewelry and my long hair bunned, but 
underneath it all were boxer shorts. I didn’t sprout a beard-hair until I was 24, but I never shaved 
my legs. I carried a satchel, but the compliment was always “I like your purse.” And 
acquaintances remember my flared pants as long skirts. I did draw a fine-line with my finery, my 
appearance-oriented gender-bending, not as transgender as others assumed. This was before the 
name “transgendered” emerged, anyway, when the “gay group” on campus was The Gay and 
Lesbian People’s Union (versus today’s all-inclusive title Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals, 
Transgendered, & Friends). There were androgynes, but androgyny—in popular culture—
registered as gender-bending not gender-blending. And I felt blurry.  
I stopped going to the men’s room. Several times as I washed my hands in a public men’s 
room, an entering man gasped, exiting with a blushing “Sorry” only to re-enter, aggressively 
suspicious after seeing that he had indeed entered the men’s room, the right room, in which I was 
clearly wrong. Female friends would say, “Come go with me,” but I was just as wrong (legally in 
this case) “going” in the women’s room—even if I sat down to do it. Misidentified in one room, I 
as an atypically feminine “intruder” risked male violence. In the other room, mis-identified as a 
typically violent male intruder, I risked arrest. I was trapped, nervously bladdered, somewhere 
between the urinal cake and the tampon dispenser. Forever having to pee.     
I was looking for a name, for myself or my experience. I considered “perceived woman.” 
Walking down a given street, I became adept at telling when strangers perceived me as female 
(normal response—no anxiety about difference) and when they perceived me as male (surprised 
or threatened reaction, pause of what?; realization-revulsion however minimal or polite; or 
sometimes that transgressing second look). This shifting in being perceived translated into a 
shifting perception of myself, shifting every time I was seen or talked to on the phone or read in 
poetry workshops. Well aware of violence against women, I nonetheless rated rape a possibility 
should I be assumed female, while bashing rated an inevitability should I be clocked as natively 
male; and should a rapist assume me female, surely realization of my maleness would incur 
bashing. This shifting risk as a “perceived woman” and “presumed fag” brought home to me the 
biding relationship between misogyny and homophobia, but the name “perceived-woman” 
expressed only resemblance to, not identification with, women. 
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This return-essay asks the questions: Was I so mistaken to name myself a woman-
identified man? What is the “necessary trouble” (as Judith Butler puts it) involved in the 
construction of such a category? For answers, I will not return to the original essay as much as 
the term it constructs and the terms and theories that inform that construction: “Woman-
identified male” from woman-identified woman, woman-loving woman, womanist, woman-
centered woman, gynocentrist, woman’s psyche, women’s sphere, “reading like a woman,” 
feminine writing, and lesbian. Before the theory, however, I want to address the time period of 
the original essay, how I came to be open to such theory and to claim an identity that is not 
transsexual yet is based on what I perceived as my identification with women. With this temporal 
and personal context established, and with the help of ever-evolving feminist theory, the title’s 
ambiguous implication that a “woman-identified male” is both honoring and appropriating the 
name of “woman” is taken to task as the category of woman is exploded and “necessary 
trouble”—this ongoing negotiation of identity—suggests itself as the only acceptable essence.          
 
The Importance Of Being (___________)—or: Naming Identity In The 1980’s 
By the end of the 1980s, I was just beginning to name myself: psychologically, culturally, 
spiritually, theoretically. I was, like many young people, in search of a reason: why I was. I 
wanted a reason with a name: who I was. Derogatory names and a related threat of violence had 
me turned against myself by age 14, and state-required county counseling allowed me my first 
opportunity to find a name for myself with the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory 
test. I diligently answered the long series of true/false questions, filling in every oval perfectly.  
How disappointed I was when my counselor patted me on the knee with apology: “The results 
came back ‘inconclusive’.”  
 
I told her I was hoping for manic depressive or something like that.  
“Sounds to me,” she said sadly, “like you’re just lonely.”  
 
 Lonely in my consciousness preceded the words outsider and individual, both informed 
by the counterculture of a nearby university town. Many of my weekends were spent there, 
where norm-defying punk (cast as a masculine) and new wave (cast as feminine) subcultures 
were shuffled into the same basement band scene. My teen years witnessed a site of possibility 
for gender, sexual orientation, class, and race that the conservatism of my all-white hometown 
occluded. The underground may have been dominated by males, too, but masculinity was not 
their domain exclusively anymore than femininity was a female domain. Morrissey—the Noel 
Coward of 80s counterculture—worked a fey claim to celibacy while he crooned the queerest 
lyrics of the decade. Yet he and gender-bent male icons like Boy George or Pete Burns hardly 
sparked my identity-fire like Laurie Anderson, Joan Armatrading, Kate Bush, Wendy O. 
Williams, Grace Jones. It mattered that I identified with these women, not that these women 
were themselves “woman-identified.”1  
 A separately occurring countercultural movement that influenced my identification with 
women was New Ageism. Combining the occult, Eastern mysticism, and North American 
commercialism, the New Age movement offered reasons for why I was homosexual, why I was a 
feminine male, reasons supposedly dimensions beyond patriarchal Christian. “Society tells you, 
you are a crime against nature, a sin against God,” explains one new age icon who happens to be 
homosexual, but New Age logic [I am from God = God is within me = I am God] affords him 
this response: “And then you get to the point when you recognize that you are God and there is 
nothing wrong with you.” Talk about empowerment2. Unfortunately, New Age metaphysical 
explanations relating gender and sexual orientation to the soul taint spirituality with homophobia 
and an elevated gender binary. The classic New Age explanation for homosexuality is derived 
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from Edgar Cayce’s explanation of karma in which he uses the example of a French court 
gossipmonger who, because he cruelly exposed homosexuals, reincarnated as a homosexual 
himself. But homosexuality can’t always be a form of punishment. Shirley MacLaine in Out on a 
Limb (1983) offers this possible and pathologizing reason for homosexuality: “Maybe a soul 
makes a rocky transition from a female to a male body…, and there’s leftover emotional residue 
and attraction from the previous incarnation” (199). As for why I was born a sissy, Louise P. 
Hauck suggests that my soul “might have been afraid of the female aspects of self” and chose “a 
‘macho’ father who, in pushing his son to prove his maleness, actually serves as a catalyst for the 
feminine self, turning the boy away from insensitivity” (48). Distinct from popular culture’s 
androgyny, the New Age spin on the gender binary as yin energy (intuitive, receiving, accepting) 
and yang energy (powerful, thrusting, active) exalts androgyny as the perfectly desireless state of 
balance required for a soul to transcend the earthly plane. In our earthbound bodies, though, the 
soul (like humankind) is split into two gendered “sides” seemingly irreconcilable (MacLaine, 
Dancing in the Light, 269, 350-351, 368,). Down to our “chakras,” a system of energy points up 
and down the body requiring “alignment” for spiritual health, we are divided into masculine (the 
three higher points on the body relate to the earth plane) and feminine (three lower relate to 
spirit) (MacLaine, Going Within, 185-197).  
In its ethereal essentialism, New Age thought allowed me to think of myself as having a 
disproportionately feminine soul, a woman’s soul, if not a female body, a theory rooted in Karl 
Heinrich Ulrich’s (1825-1895) description of himself as “a woman’s soul trapped in a man’s 
body”; offered by Mae West as an appeal to NYC police to curb beatings of homosexuals 
(“You’re hitting a woman,” she told them); and expressed in many transsexual autobiographies 
of the latter twentieth century3. I never considered myself transsexual, but this perception of my 
femaleness as a transhistorical energy allowed me to feel a “right” to identify with “woman,” to 
claim the heritage of “woman’s struggle,” as I must have been female in the majority of my past 
lives to make for such a rocky and residue’d transition to this male body. New Age androgyny as 
a transcendent state, compared to patriarchy’s gender hierarchy as a social ideal, still requires the 
binary but perfectly balanced, a balance so essentially 50/50 it seems equally oppressive: too 
much femininity is spiritually lopsided, just as it is at the level of the sissy’s body, leaving me in 
essence not androgynous because—as ever, as ever—I was not masculine enough.  
Finding an identity—finding out who you “really” are, or, for New Agers, who you 
“were”—obsessed North Americans in the 1980s. The integrity of human experience seemed 
marked by the degree to which you were an individual, to which you were your own man. This 
pursuit, however, was in constant conflict with anxieties about difference that plagued the last of 
these Cold War years as much as it did the first of them, especially when it came to being a man. 
Infection as a metaphor for the commie/queer “menace” in the 50s became literal in the 80s 
when AIDS was a “gay disease,” so even though “the ‘sensitive New Age guy’ poised as a 
masculine template for the decade,” very few revered him. According to Michael Kimmel’s 
Manhood in America—A Cultural History (1996), “the manhood regained under Presidents 
Reagan and Bush was the compulsive masculinity of the schoolyard bully…, a defensive and 
restive manhood, of men who needed to demonstrate their masculinity at every opportunity” 
(292). Kimmel examines the media-dubbed “wimp factor” of the 80s, how quiche-eaters like the 
“New Age Guy” were actually sought out as negative models to attack (292-293). And gays—
especially ones marked by gender transitivity—were sought out to bash: gays were seven times 
more likely to be crime victims than the average American, according to the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force (Newsweek 12 March 1990: 22). GenderPAC founder Riki Wilchins told 
A&E’s “Investigative Reports” that gender hate crimes were almost always “up close and 
personal” which means “when you look at the police autopsy reports you see the same phrase 
over and over again: multiple stab-wounds to the head, breast, and neck area. They want to 
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basically make this person go away…” and by extension make go away the whole lot of gender-
nonconformists scapegoated more and more in the U.S. Tellingly, the faggots that Axl Rose sang 
about with such paranoia were paired with immigrants coming into “our country”: “They don’t 
make sense to me…. they think they’ll do as they please” (GNR Lies, 1988).   
 Galvanized by crises, gay communities pulled their grassroots together and really came 
into focus in the U.S. “We’re here, We’re Queer”: coming out by saying just who I am: naming 
myself out and loud: claiming a community as I claim an identity: having parades. In Chicago, 
the city of parades, a city diverse in its communities, having an ethnic identity is “a critical part 
of Chicago’s political map and idiom” and “’ethnicity’ has become a model for gays and 
lesbians, who now think their community as one like other[s]” (Herrell, 422). Richard Herrell’s 
semiotic analysis of how the gay pride parades have changed over the years proves that 
assimilate-able is the newest demand on gay identity; gay parades seek to “present the gay 
community as composed of families, of churches and sports leagues, of clubs and professional 
associations, of everything about normative society except simply sexual behavior” (427).   
Following the example of the women’s movement, self-identity for gays and lesbians in 
the 1980s further conflated the personal and the political, helping to advance “gay rights” and 
AIDS research. Christopher Capozzola examines how the Names Project’s AIDS Memorial Quilt 
participated in the reworking of American identity in the 1980s by “accommodat[ing] multiple 
identities at the same time that it created a collective one.”  
 
Arriving in the middle of an era of identity-based politics, the AIDS epidemic 
taught that diseases create identities…. People with AIDS did not exist as a social 
category that could act in the arenas of interest-group politics before the 
disease…. Had gay men not already been organized as a political and cultural 
body around their identities, they would not have been able to mobilize politically 
and culturally specific responses to a crisis that disproportionately affected them 
as a group. (102-103) 
 
Identity politics served a vital purpose as political expression, then. But now, by essentializing 
the meaning of gay or lesbian (in sexed definitions and in more abstract notions like “gay 
sensibility” and “gaydar”), identity politics are said to reproduce the very marginality that gay 
oppression attempts to enforce (Fuss 1989; D’Emilio, 2003).   
 In 1989, in the Women’s Studies course for which I originally addressed the subject of 
“woman-identification,” theories that constructed “woman” as “born woman” and/or women’s 
culture as defined by “female energy” were in a tense relationship with the theories that 
invited—and effectively complicated—my so-called identification with women, theories to 
which I will now turn.   
 
Milk Signatures—or: Conceptualizing “Lesbian” 
 The term “woman-identified” goes back to “The Woman-Identified Woman,” a paper 
written in 1970 by a group named the “Radicalesbians” who   
 
hoped to find a common ground within feminism for all women by providing a 
theoretical counter to accepted understanding of lesbianism…. Thus the radical 
feminist focus on sex and sex roles was joined with the issue of “sexual 
preference” to produce a common base for lesbians and heterosexual women…. 
The conclusion…is that the basic structure of control over women is that of 
sexuality, and in particular the requirement of heterosexuality. (Phelan, 40-41)    
 
 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol 5 #5  June 2004 109 
 
In the Philosophical Perspectives of Women class, one of the first essays we read, “To 
See and Be Seen—The Politics of Reality” (1983) by Marilyn Frye, changed my life, though it 
seemed to have nothing to do with my life. I was not a lesbian, but in asking the question “What 
is a lesbian?”, Frye’s epiphany that there is no lesbian in “phallocratic reality” [ = “reality” 
constructed and maintained by patriarchy] reflected my own failed attempt to find myself there. 
Given the dictionary’s tendency to cater to stereotype or reduce “lesbian” to either genital-
contact or “female versions” of gay men, and given the socio-political and historical invisibility 
of lesbians, Frye’s epiphany is accessible for any reader. She also points out that there is no 
opposite word for misogyny, no word in the English language that means “woman-loving” (81). 
This question of “What is a ‘woman-loving’ woman?” asked at the same time as the question 
“What is a lesbian?” opened for me a closed vision. If woman-loving or woman-identifying can 
be philosophized as a “reorientation of attention in a kind of ontological conversion,” as “the 
event of becoming a lesbian,” then even I could come out of the closet as a lesbian? But to name 
myself “lesbian” seemed cheeky, an easy appropriation of a word only an elite few might hear as 
metaphor for woman-identified experience. I did recognize, nonetheless, ways of appreciating 
my identity at once as a “perceived woman” in my body and a woman-perceiver, or “woman-
seer” as Frye puts it, in my values.  
 The “gynocentric” movement within feminism spoke profoundly to me because it  
brought androgyny down to earth, releasing me from the idea that my gendered soul need 
achieve perfect balance to “transcend.” On earth, where we live, gynocentrism roots women’s 
oppression not in being or having to be “feminine” but “as the devaluation and repression of 
women’s experience by a masculine culture…[and, in fact,] argues for the superiority of the 
values embodied in traditionally female experience” (Young, 73) [my emphasis]. Here we go, I 
thought, but still, what right did I have to claim a name like gynocentrist? Alice Walker helped 
induce gynocentrism by naming her prose “womanist prose,” introducing In Search of Our 
Mothers’ Gardens (1976) with a two-tier definition laid out dictionary-style on the page 
following Walker’s dedication to her daughter. The first tier defines womanist as “a feminist of 
color,” and on the second tier “womanist” is: “a woman who loves women, sexually and/or 
nonsexually. Appreciates and prefers women’s culture, women’s emotional flexibility…, and 
women’s strength” (xi). I found it interesting that the racialized definition resisted outright 
gender specificity (even if the 70s assumption was that there “were no male feminists” to 
include), while the universal definition specifies first word that a womanist is “a woman.” Did 
Walker mean woman as a biological female, or woman as a cultural experience whose values are 
informed but not strictly defined by biology? I presumed she meant the former and I resented it. I 
preferred and supported women’s culture. I marched to Take Back the Night when, in the 80s, 
the connection between rapist and basher was loudly unacknowledged. And then I felt guilty, 
afraid I was “typically with penis” by centering my concerns for half a minute. Looking at it 
another way: Wasn’t I, in this apologetic deference to biological females as more “authentically” 
or “credibly” feminist, acting more like a “typical woman”?  
I was confused a lot, yes. Just as my perception of my gendered-self shifted continually 
walking down any given street, when reading feminist theory my perception of my gendered-self 
vacillated between not forgetting that I was biologically male (having “less claim” to feminism) 
and liberating myself from biological destiny (through feminism, especially its meta-categorical 
use of “lesbian” as a figurative term for a woman-oriented consciousness).   
 In the women's studies classroom, I had to ask myself: was I reading like the women I sat 
with? I was reading feminist philosophy, but was I reading it like a woman? Jonathan Culler 
exposes as a divided request that women should read so because “it appeals to the condition of 
being a woman as if it were a given and simultaneously urges this condition be created or 
achieved” (49). Few women may actually read as women, until recently anyway, either 
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“identifying against herself” and reading as a “man” (in order to assimilate into patriarchal 
academia, for example) or just not reading as a “woman” (alienated from their own interests as a 
social group and not recognizing the “specific defenses and distortions of male readings”) (49-
54). So reading like a woman is a paradoxical act, even for a woman, for whom “to read as a 
woman is not to repeat an identity or an experience that is given but to play a role she constructs 
with reference to her identity as a woman, which is also a construct, so that the series can 
continue: a woman reading as a woman reading as a woman” (64) [my emphasis]. Perhaps I was 
a male-bodied homosexual reading as a feminine man reading as a perceived woman reading as a 
woman-identified person? Rachel Blau Duplessis might have granted me a pink guitar. Helene 
Cixous might have allowed that I too write in “white ink,” a gynocentric manifestation—central 
in political/cultural debate in 1970s France—which she refers to as ecriture feminine [“feminine 
writing” = writing like a woman].  
Cixous may at one point assert that feminine writing involves  
 
a) woman writing through her socially/culturally censored body  
[a body that I can’t write through even if perceived as having one], and   
b) woman writing woman, and man writing man  
[the former which I learned from, and the latter which I, as an 
“effeminate” man, neither accessed nor knew how to accomplish],  
 
but she does later concede to a “decipherable libidinal femininity” which can be read in writing 
produced by a male or a female (qtd. Conley, 129). As Showalter4 elucidates, feminine writing is 
a style, it is how you write: non-linear and open-ended, carrying not containing, multiple in 
tongue: “writing (in) the in-between…not fixed…but infinitely dynamized by an incessant 
process of exchange from one subject to another” (Cixous, 353). It is not reduced to signature, 
not who is writing, not merely the sex of the author. Cixous’ ecriture feminine reflects what 
Sherry Ortner calls woman’s psyche—not innate to females but accounted for by the 
socialization experience they nearly universally share, that I shared, too, whether I was supposed 
to or not. This “psychic mode seemingly typical of women…tends to disregard categories and to 
seek ‘communion’…directly and personally with others” (37). Cixous herself refuses to subject 
feminine writing to category, closure, or code. When she says she writes as a woman toward 
women, she is “speaking of woman in her inevitable struggle against conventional man” (347), 
which was my ongoing struggle then as now (though I’d struggle, too, with the difference 
between “conventional man” and “conventional masculinity”).    
 Adrienne Rich, in her 1976 essay “It Is the Lesbian In Us,” believes 
 
it is the lesbian in every woman who is compelled by female energy, who 
gravitates toward strong women, who seeks a literature that will express that 
energy and strength. It is the lesbian in us who drives us to feel imaginatively. 
(143) 
 
Rich was first to untether the term “lesbian” from its marginalized and too-literal bed, making it 
available—as a consciousness, as an “orientation of attention,” as a political affiliation—for all 
women, for all…. I still can’t say it: 
I am (not) a lesbian. 
Her classic essay “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” written in 1980 
with addendums in 1982 and 1986, is a perfect example of the resistance to closure Cixous 
respects as feminine writing. Rich’s concept of a lesbian continuum “includes a range—through 
each woman’s life and throughout history—of woman-identified experience” (237). By woman-
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identified experience Rich means “a source of energy, a potential springhead of female power, 
curtailed and contained under the institution of heterosexuality” (245). Would she have said 
“feminine power,” I could have felt included, if only indirectly, for my apparent femininity was 
indeed curtailed (punished) and contained (by fear and shame), too, under the patrolling eye of 
patriarchy. By using “female,” Rich risks what Iris Young claims that gynocentrism risks: 
essentialism via the retention of dichotomous terms (88). Furthermore, reference to female 
“energy” smacks of that New Age spin on essentialism discussed earlier.  
Julia Kristeva believes that feminism should not fight for “woman”—not the “female” 
nor the “lesbian”—but against fixed identity and the sexed body (see Oliver, 97-99). Kristeva 
posits “feminine” as both the experience of female bodies and the cultural experience of aspects 
of language and behavior Western culture has devalued and repressed (see Young, 85). But 
“feminine” is still limited. I could have said “I am ‘feminine-identified,’” but I know many 
feminine women and men who are far from feminist. Furthermore, if I were strictly “feminine-
identified,” how could I claim influence by figures like Patti Smith (70s rock-poet messiah who 
had only male rebels to model herself after), Grace Jones (one of the women who “scared men 
most,” according to a Men’s Health poll), Wendy O. Williams (pacifist vegetarian metal-
punker), and Polly Styrene (screaming the anthem “Oh Bondage Up Yours!”) who set the stage 
for Bikini Kill and L7 (politically-charged lesbian “riot grrrls”) in the 1990s? Gynocentricism’s 
exaltation of the feminine as superior to the masculine displaces women who appear and/or 
behave in apparently masculine ways yet claim to be feministic in values, to be woman-loving, 
woman-identified, or lesbian in the woman-identified sense of the word as well as in the “butch” 
sense of the word. Not until Judith Halberstam’s 1998 book Female Masculinity did a theorist 
seriously attempt to detach misogyny from maleness and social power from masculinity5. The 
above-mentioned icons taught me that I could swagger—be aggressive, angry, and loud (all 
“masculine” traits)—with a feminist conscience, reorienting patriarchy’s masculinity.  
At the time of Rich’s essay, the male-dominated “gay rights movement” mostly 
begrudged lesbians a space, so why should Rich have included gay men in her feminist theory? 
Regardless of this general truth, many female-born feminists in the 1970s-80s may have guarded 
too defensively their conviction that “their experience as women is a source of [feminist] 
authority” (Culler, 46). Janice Raymond in 1979 refused to applaud either androgynous men or 
transsexually constructed lesbian-feminists who “lure women into believing that they are truly 
one of us—this time not only one in behavior but one in spirit and conviction” (100). The place 
for transsexuals to deal with their problems, she concludes, is among transsexuals themselves 
(116). Lesbian feminist Shane Phelan asks too the “nagging question among feminists: ‘But what 
about men?’ The answer can now be given straightforwardly: Men must take care of themselves. 
The priority for women, the truly revolutionary call of feminism, must be the union of women” 
(45). Except obliquely, Cixous excuses herself from having to address traditional or exceptional 
males: “It’s up to him to say where his masculinity and femininity are at,” she explains, later 
calling this man’s “other history.” “This will concern us once men have opened their eyes” (348, 
353). All these years later, reading this, I shift here in my chair: “once men have opened their 
eyes”: she can’t be talking about me? 
    
 The Commute—or: “Well Then, I’ll Come To You”  
 An essay that spoke directly to my daily “shifting” experience as an undergraduate 
addressed the conscious “traveling” from one identity-defined context to another. I became a 
“willful ‘world’-traveler,” according to philosopher Mary Lugones, who thinks the flexibility 
needed for this “traveling” is more readily acquired by outsiders who continually shift from a 
mainstream construction of self to other, more “at-home” constructions (275). Let me explain 
why this pertains by telling you about my first job.  
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Employed by a state agency in Southern Illinois, I provided “in-home assistance” to 
elderly, mostly female clients like my own grandmothers: white, working-to-middle class, rural 
and religious, whose fortitude deferred as a rule to a generally bigoted male authority. Many of 
these women simultaneously contradicted and reinforced the gender hierarchy, and for five years 
as an undergraduate I cleaned and cooked in their kitchens and vacuumed their widowed or 
“spinstered” rooms. Daily I “traveled”—well, commuted— between the feminist “world” of the 
women’s studies classroom and the traditional “world” of these women’s homes and 
communities in which their ideologies often opposed feminism outright. I admit my 
homosexuality and feminism were closeted in their world, reducing what there was for them to 
accept to a quirkily-dressed sissy good with a dust rag, but in that shared space I came to see 
complexity in their faith-driven domestic-centeredness. They were connected to a power that 
fluctuates between an oppressing Old Testament God (wrathful, to be feared like The Great 
Depression) and a sacrificing New Testament God (who values mother, beckons children, 
reunites loved ones in a mansion in the sky). Coming to this appreciation required that I “see 
with her eyes,” “go into her world,” as Lugones describes the concept of “world”-traveling, that 
  
I see both of us as we are constructed in her world, that I witness her own sense of 
herself from within that world. Only through this traveling to her “world” could I 
identify with her because only then could I cease to ignore her and to be excluded 
and separate from her. (280)          
 
 Mary Lugones’ 1987 essay “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and Loving Perception” 
helped to liberate me, as an outsider, from the dread of not belonging (as in, to one place). Her 
primary example of “world”-traveling involves her mother—whom she had always seen as  
passive and victimized. When she comes to see how she and her mother are constructed in her 
mother’s world, only then does she feel she can really see and love her mother. The essay 
idealizes its own theory, alas, by evading the issue of what we might call reciprocated travel. 
Lugones may conclude, “We are fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being 
understood and without this understanding we are not intelligible, we do not make sense, we are 
not solid, integrated; we are lacking” (280), but I haven’t the understanding that Lugones’ 
mother has “traveled” to her daughter’s world, seen mother and daughter constructed in 
daughter’s world. Maybe it is so, but it cannot always be so, as with my elderly clients.  
 Of course they could not travel to my world, really, due to miles and the cultural distance 
to the college town where I was out, where “Melissa the Mohawk Girl” wore rosaries and 
combat boots, where god in the classroom loses capitalization. And of my own mother: knowing 
I am homosexual, she must live in her world in a closet as the mother of a homosexual. She’s in 
the closet more than I am. That she cannot “travel” to my world does not mean she doesn’t love 
me, but it might mean she can’t risk identifying with me, can’t risk seeing my world too closely 
lest she lose sight of my father’s world—where she lives and I only used to live. And as much as 
she wants to brag on my writing she cannot brag too loudly lest someone in the family seek out 
publications like this one.  
 
Having, Desiring, and Lacking—or: Sissies Against Freud  
 I tend to come away discussions about Freudian theory feeling somehow complicit in the 
construction of a false given: a “family” defined by the presence of (or the absence of) a hetero-
normatively gendered mother and father6. Even what’s called “Feminist Mothering Theory” 
negates the possibility of a healthy or genuine male identification with mothers. If I bring up 
Freudian theory now it is to point out its inadequacies as a way to think about gender, sexual 
orientation, and identity. 
 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol 5 #5  June 2004 113 
 
 I prefer Judith Butler’s description of gender as a “performance that produces the illusion 
of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core” (“Imitation,” 317) because she stresses the 
production (an ongoing process) rather than the illusion achieved. Experts in 1975 called that 
illusion one’s “core gender identity” and declared it “locked tight” by eighteen months (Money, 
91). In 1987, they linked unequivocally “sissy boy syndrome” and homosexual orientation: 
“Barbies at five. Sleeps with men at twenty-five.”7 Of the relationship between sex-typed 
behavior and homosexual orientation in men, Zucker & Bailey in 1993 noted that “homosexual 
individuals recall substantially more childhood cross-sex-typed behavior” (55), but analogous 
studies for women remain to be done and “within-orientation variation in sex-typed behavior” 
has yet to be explained. Ken Zucker, current head of the Child and Adolescent Gender Identity 
Clinic in Toronto, believes in a treatment for boys with Gender Identity Disorder (GID) that 
encourages acceptance of birth sex and disallows “feminine play.”       
 Resistance to this kind of thinking and treatment is becoming less uncommon. Most 
recently, K.K. Wilson challenges the “disparate” classifications of gender and sexual orientation 
in American psychiatry and criticizes GID as problematic in that—for one example—boys are 
inexplicably held to a much stricter standard of conformity than girls (www.priory.com/psych/ 
disparat.htm); boys, too, are more likely than girls to be referred for psychiatric help in the first 
place (Frable, 141). Richard Ashmore, back in 1990, defined gender identity with more 
sensitivity to its complexity: “the structured set of gendered personal identities that results when 
the individual takes the social construction of gender and the biological ‘facts’ of sex and 
incorporates them into an overall concept” (512; see Frable, 144). To pull the rug out from under 
gender’s feet, some critics demand we call into question the social norms of masculinity and 
femininity themselves (Raymond, 77), that, for example, studies reveal fathers as more 
concerned with sex-typing than mothers (75) and that a child’s cross-sex-typed behavior could 
be the cause rather than the consequence of father-distance (Langlois & Downs, 1980; see 
Zucker & Bradley, 46). The most current psychoanalytic theory still fails to allow for  
 
the possibility that a feminine boy could have his own feminine identity. Rather 
he is seen as subsumed within his mother’s identity. There has been no effort to 
entertain the ways in which a boy may identify with his mother distinct from a 
regressive lack of separation…. There is no consideration of the possibility that a 
mother’s and son’s subjectivities may afford greater closeness and empathy. 
(Corbett, 129) 
 
 Nancy Chodorow’s “Feminist Mothering” spin on Freud (The Reproduction of 
Mothering, 1978) and Adrienne Rich’s engagement with Chodorow (in “Compulsory 
Heterosexuality”) present theories in which male identification with mothers is, at best, 
unsustainable. Isaac D. Balbus, in “Masculinity and the (M)Other” (2002), explains the 
consistent flaw in Chodorow’s theory as an assumption that all mothers and girls experience 
themselves as the same (discouraging separation) whereas boys separate with greater ease from 
mothers “both because of the internal pull toward separation that results from the boy’s 
experience of an opposition between his gender and hers and because this internal pull will be 
complimented by an external push toward separation that results from her experience of him as a 
‘male opposite’” (221). Balbus challenges the claim that “mothers necessarily treat their little 
boys in a way that is fundamentally different from the way they treat their little girls” (222), 
responding to Chodorow’s “gender determinism” by pointing out, first off,  how she “ignores 
differences in the quality of parenting practice under the prevailing mother-dominated structure 
of child-rearing” (212). To take Balbus’s challenge a step further, we should explore how 
differences in parents’ individual gender experiences inform parenting practice. Mothering 
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theory makes no allowance for the varying “success” with which females (mothers) succeed—
physically and behaviorally—at being women (maternal); nor does it deem possible the maternal 
father. Furthermore, variation in children’s “success” at gender-appropriateness remains largely 
unacknowledged: of children who do “succeed” at appropriate gender display, these theories fail 
to consider how inconsistently absorbed are the terms of that display.   
 Private practitioner Ken Corbett, in his 1999 essay “Homosexual Boyhood: Notes on 
Girlyboys,” chooses to add “girlyboy” to the queer nomenclature because the inherently 
contradictory name grants gender—rather than denies it—possible forms within homosexuality 
that unsettle and/or transcend the gender binary. A keenly defined but open-ended category, 
“girlyboys” do not deny our penises, do not believe we are girls, nor do we want to grow up to be 
females, exactly, but we are aware of identifying with our mothers more than most boys; neither 
do we feel ourselves to be boys, exactly, at least as defined by fathers and male peers (121, 126). 
Of one such “girlyboy” client, worried obsessively that getting an erection in the boys’ locker 
room will “make him a girl,” Corbett’s epiphany (akin to Frye’s about the lesbian) is that in our 
two-gendered culture this client may have no way of perceiving himself—his body versus his 
identity—as both a male-desiring and female-identifying boy. “Having, desiring, and lacking 
contribute to a unique gender experience” (125), Corbett concludes. And this doesn’t touch on 
how commonly sexual abuse, physical and verbal, complicates a girlyboy’s already complicated 
sense of self and other.  
It’s not that I made a choice, really, to resist male identification and prefer interaction 
with females; we’re born into a world that genders us before we know it. As I started to “know” I 
failed to conform; over time I resisted conforming. Over time: always shifting between—or 
experiencing at once—failure and resistance, unconscious identification and conscious 
identification. How do you measure that? Psycho-barometrically? As the distance between 
Venus and Mars? The combined volume of a classroom, a mosh pit, and a kitchen?   
 
Where Women Are—or: Where the Men Aren’t 
If an individual’s identity depends on recognizing how others are different, then shared 
space might diminish the gender difference between a mother and son assumed to push and pull 
them apart. “The girlyboy’s domain” is the kitchen, according to Corbett, described as a 
“domestic vision” wherein the “girlyboy” identifies with women. The isolated and in its way 
independent sphere of “the kitchen,” as a distinctly feminine space inside the man’s house, 
makes for women a life of duality: as women with men in the dominant culture, and as women 
“in the kitchen” with other women and away from men (a “cultur-ette” so to speak). Recalling 
her childhood, bell hooks honors “a deeper intimacy in the kitchen on Saturdays when hair is 
pressed…a time without men. It is a time when we work as women to meet each other’s needs, 
to make each other feel good inside” (221). Male children among this tableau seem almost 
unnatural, but we are there—sometimes doing the hair ourselves. One of my best friends was a 
Pentecostal sissy whose hands were in constant demand in his childhood home; how 
ambidextrously he piled into a sort of cursive his mothers’ and sisters’ never-cut hair. Eventually 
he was excommunicated.     
Remember that margarine commercial with the tag-line, “It’s not nice to fool Mother 
Nature”? How nature’s wrath (thunder) and a lady’s propriety (being “nice”) came together in a 
single female icon: all related to the butter dish in your refrigerator. A “woman-defined sphere” 
may well be carved from margarine: alluding to the natural while reinforcing domestication. In 
this section, I will look at the theoretical construction of this sphere in which I identified with 
women, and, in the next section, I will examine class assumptions about this sphere and the 
identification assumed to go on therein.    
 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol 5 #5  June 2004 115 
 
Cixous calls the feminine sphere “the realm of the gift,” described by feminist critic Toril 
Moi as full of milk and honey, “a deconstructive space of pleasure and orgasmic interchange 
with the other” (113), and from this space ecriture feminine is born. In 1972, Edward Ardener—
proposing that “women constitute a muted group, the boundaries of whose culture and reality 
overlap, but are not wholly contained by the dominant (male) group”—calls that uncontained 
sphere a “wild zone.” He considers this zone spatially (as a place forbidden to men), 
experientially (as aspects of female life disregarded or unexperienced by men), and 
metaphysically (claiming there is no corresponding “zone” for males whose consciousness 
belongs to the dominant structure totally) (see Showalter, 199). “Wild” seems the wrong word, 
though, and Sherry Ortner’s “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” (1996) in title alone 
points out an essentialism in the alignment of woman with the wild. Anyway, we’ve all heard 
that “the frontier is no place for a woman”; it’s a literary commonplace, asserts Dawn Lander, 
outright contradicting Ardener’s “wild” metaphor. Actually, as Culler explains, “the myth of 
women’s hatred of the frontier [is] an attempt by men to make the frontier an escape from 
everything women represent to them” (45).   
 That all-female spaces are indeed “woman-defined” is mythical. Even privacy—
trademark of female space—is a compromise of “everything women as women have never been 
allowed to be or have” and “everything women have been equated with and defined in terms of 
men’s ability to have” (McKinnon, 656; see Sedgwick, 110). Female-dominated spaces are often 
patriarchally-maintained in the absence of males, as in conservative girls’ schools or nunneries 
(Rich, 182) and in factories where women doing piece-work rarely form alliances. One would 
have to speak metaphysically to think of a space not contained by patriarchy; and would a 
traditionally-experienced woman’s “psyche” be that liminal space, mightn’t it be contained by 
metaphysical walls? Phoebe Snow sings that her world is composed of “ceilings, floors, and 
hallways…my seasons and my days.”  
 Virginia Woolf, quite critical of “walls,” sings the tune her own way: concluding chapter 
one of A Room of One’s Own  (1929), she equates “locked in” with the safety and prosperity of 
men, and “locked out” with the poverty and insecurity of women. This makes sense in that those 
inside are sheltered and those outside are exposed to the elements thus vulnerable. If it were that 
simple, though, the vulnerable would have adapted to “wild” life centuries ago and the two 
gendered spheres of existence—as we see it in the West—might be in very different proportions. 
But there is no such bucolic realm for women. The world for most women is not the hills alive 
with the sound of music, no matter what the first scene tells you. Their world is mostly inside 
after all. Not inside like men are inside, but inside inside. Where warmth (security) often feels 
like heat (claustrophobia) and the wallpaper fades yellowly like an unwritten page. Of ceilings, 
floors and hallways, of women’s seasons and days, Woolf says:   
 
Women have sat indoors all these millions of years so that by this time the very 
walls are permeated by their creative force, which has, indeed, so overcharged the 
capacity of bricks and mortar that it must need harness itself to pens and brushes 
and business and politics. (91)  
 
 Marilyn Frye describes women’s lives as “background” to phallocratic reality’s 
foreground (90-91), while Simone de Beauvoir’s starkly metaphorizes their lives as 
“imprisonment.” That I might be identifying with women as prisoners, as confined, interests me 
as one-time closet-case. Tennessee Williams claims that his ability to create believable female 
characters is due to his sense of his own psyche as inhabited by “a little congregation of panicky 
ladies, and/or tramps. Why panicky?” he asks. “Because they are confined there” (145). So 
shared understanding of confinement could be the key to woman-identification, but, as much 
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I’ve sweated claustrophobically from being trapped in place, I know at times I have envied the 
security of having “a place.” My mother, as a woman whose femininity ceased to matter in the 
glue-fumes of a windowless shoe factory, she dreamed of being a middle-class housewife, of that 
pretty version of confinement. Would she have been this traditional wife in our home, according 
to Beauvoir, she might have been “deprived there of activity, los[ing] herself in things and 
becom[ing] dependent on them” (see Young, 78). Losing herself to pretty things. 
 
 “Pretty Things”—or: Risk in the Kitchen 
 “He just loved pretty things,” said one girlyboy’s mother (Corbett, 130). “I was always in 
the kitchen with the women,” said another (128). Corbett says this “in-the-kitchen-with-the-
women sentiment embodies a stereotype of protogay boys” (128), extending the kitchen—as if 
all kitchens were pretty—to include what Ken Zucker discourages: “feminine play” (doll play, 
dress up, etc.). My issue with the term “feminine play” is twofold: 1) the term sums down play to 
a feminine essence, and 2) that feminine essence is a middle-class construction.    
 For kids, play is an ongoing experiment with physicality, a general truth of which adults 
lose sight. I liked to clop around in my grandma’s shoes, and swing a towel like long hair, sure, 
but I also remember being obsessed with casts, crutches, and wheelchairs; the latter, however, 
did not cause my parents to worry about the possibility of my someday becoming handicapped. 
This is not to claim that physicality is sole compelling factor behind what is called “feminine 
play,” but that by the time play is deemed “feminine” the more generally physical aspect of play 
is eclipsed. Judy Attfield’s semiotic analysis of the designs of Barbie and Action Man provides 
another way to think about doll play and the child’s imagination in relation to physicality and 
gender identity. Careful not to conclude that design dictates play,8 Attfield points out how 
“fashion dolls” like Barbie feature only elemental joints for dressing and posing while “action 
figures” like Action Man are designed to act physically, adding an anatomically incorrect joint to 
the biceps for maximum flexibility (85-86). Instead of disallowing “feminine play,” Zucker et al. 
might do better to examine dolls as gendered objects shaping a child’s understanding of 
femininity through play. And as for baby-dolls being outlawed, “mother blamers” will always be 
in business if boys are raised to avoid being maternal.       
Even if we accept the play and the sphere as “feminine,” the girlyboy’s body is not 
merely dolled up or accessorized: it is the site of a delighted-in masquerade that neither claims 
femaleness nor disowns maleness. In “de-feminizing” a boy, femininity is often reduced to a 
petty vanity (“prettiness”) not necessarily inherent to his displays. He may suffer more from their 
projection than they believe he suffers from identity disorder and the tragedy may well be that 
the “girlyboy” does not develop beyond surface-fixations equated with stereotypical femininity. 
He may “lose himself,” as Beauvoir warns many women do, to signification by “pretty things.”  
And here I stumble onto the second half of the false given. I’ve already touched on the 
truth that female-dominated spaces are often patriarchally-maintained in the absence of males, 
but in exploring the “women’s sphere” and the girlyboy’s “domestic vision,” it becomes evident 
that both are specifically middle-class constructions. My logic slips—almost helplessly—into the 
assumption that all girlyboys have access to the class of femininity or bourgeois culture that 
invites or allows him to “lose himself” to “pretty things.” This is not realistic and Corbett does 
remind us, though not in reference to class, to think of femininity as a contested realm of human 
experience (117). The “women’s sphere” theories assume a woman at home, therein sacred or 
lovely, in a way lower and working-class women are far less often “at home.” In the most 
practical way, spatially, opportunity for a separate “sphere” is greatly diminished in a trailer, for 
instance, where kitchen, dining room, and living room are generally one room. My childhood 
home was kept-up but not lovely, in spirit or décor, really, and factory-work had dinged the 
prettiness my mother boasted in old photos. She says of my childhood years that she was so tired 
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all the time that she “doesn’t remember much”; that tiredness left her in rare moods for clothes 
shopping and dressing up. Her reason for not going to church was never having anything nice to 
wear. So I cannot claim that I as a “girlyboy” was identifying with my mother by dressing up as 
she never dressed up. What if a girlyboy’s over-worked mother cannot achieve, afford, or 
identify with the femininity to which girlyboys seem to “aspire”? If femininity as a middle-class 
ideal is not maintainable for many lower and working class women, then are lower and working 
class girlyboys fixated on appearance to be double-shamed?     
This makes me wonder if the mothers and mother-figures with whom “girlyboys” 
identify most are as appropriately feminine as their boys are inappropriately so? Or is it possible 
that the majority of case studies on which “sissy” theories are based are from classes who can 
afford such therapy? The “Annual Review of Psychology” (1997), emphasizes that current 
gender identity research excludes racial and ethnic minorities and those who are not middle 
class, and sexual identity research focuses on white middle-class gay men and lesbians (Frable, 
155).  
I claimed the kitchen my safety zone, but this was precariously so, never quite the 
“girlyboy domain” of which Corbett speaks, nor the “domestic vision” I would like to remember. 
The more apparent my comfort in this women’s room, the more conspicuous I was, not always to 
the women present but the working-class men passing through. My presence in “the kitchen” 
unfortunately jeopardized its independence, for the corruption of my masculinity could be 
blamed on that sphere, thereby requiring the interference of patriarchal forces. Should that sphere 
be evaluated by men, then whatever “women’s culture” there was in my family stood to lose its 
unacknowledged status as a system beyond men (if not beyond patriarchal ideology). My father 
would never have sought the advice of a therapist, but had he in the 1970s or 1980s, he would 
have been told: “You’ve got to keep these mothers out of the way. Feminine [boys] don’t need 
their mothers around” (Green, 275).   
So-called feminine spheres outside the home were shaky too, when I could get into them. 
Boys then did not take “home-ec” or typing, boys did not play flute, boys did not read “Teen 
Beat.” I remember how hurt I was in 7th grade when my best friend called me to say she couldn’t 
talk to me anymore, meaning at school where we shared a girly sphere in the notes we passed, 
and where boys in targeting me isolated her. “You’re just too faggy,” she said. Another best 
friend across the street could have girl friends over when her parents were away but not me; as 
non-threatening as I was, to enter her house, with her there alone, would get her grounded. My 
alternating comfort-within and compromise-of feminine “spheres” buoyed and crashed me time 
and time again throughout childhood and adolescence, dosing me with a suspiciousness of 
females as allies that properly exploded my essentializing of females as allies. Imagine hanging 
out one night in the wrong parking lot: you’re the high school fag: imagine you run to your 
friend sitting in her car with her boyfriend and he won’t let you in. “Sorry,” she says.  
 
Inconclusion—or: “Necessary Trouble” 
Have I really been identifying with “woman,” or instead what Cixous calls the “false 
woman”? There is popular drag number that always gets a crowd chanting: “I’ve got the power! 
I’ve got the power!”, ringing like an empowerment song. Only the umpteenth time witnessing 
the number did I hear past the remix-redundant chorus to the female voice singing that she has 
the power…to love her man. The “false woman” is not pretending to be a woman but is falsely 
pro-woman. Pro or anti, speaking of “woman” at all opens one up for Monique Wittig’s 
criticism that “One Is Not Born a Woman” (1983), that we should  
 
thoroughly dissociate ‘women’ (the class within which we fight) and ‘woman,’ 
the myth. For ‘woman’ does not exist for us: it is only an imaginary formation, 
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while ‘women’ is the product of social relationships. ‘Woman’ is not each one of 
us, but the political and ideological formation which negates ‘women.’ ‘Woman’ 
is there to confuse us, to hide the reality of women. (107) 
 
Maybe I should have called myself a “women-identifying man” instead? But “women” as 
much as “woman” cannot be defined to please everyone. Already apparent is it that girlyboys do 
not necessarily identify with “women” but more narrowly with conforming middle-class 
women9. Even transsexually-constructed lesbian feminists, in claiming a place among women 
(not that all do), are denied peer status, accused of “violating women’s bodies by taking on the 
artifactual female organs for himself” (Raymond, 118). “Transgender” is a compelling term, 
made a cause with Boys Don’t Cry (2000), but it seems attached at the categorical hip with 
“transsexual” and both as identity categories have somehow come to stand less for transcendence 
than transformation, often pushing appearance-marked essences. Androgyny may be “the new 
sexual ideal,” “tantamount to sexual ambiguity, a redistribution of power and, above all, 
freedom” (Gaudoin, 116), but Kate Bornstein isn’t satisfied: “Androgyny is as rigid an 
assumption as a bipolar gender system. In fact, androgyny assumes bipolar, it assumes a scale 
along two poles” (Barnes, 52).  
“Gender outlaws” like Bornstein and poststructuralists like Kristeva want to dismiss 
“female” outright by way of abolishing binarized sex-category, allowing for limitless genders10. 
Referring to the gender system as a class system is a way some critics rethink gender: some 
“masculinities,” for example, achieve greater social power than others. If identification need not 
be gender-based at all, I might have been identifying with the disempowered or muted: women 
as marginalized “others.” Am I a self-perceived “other” identifying with the most immediate 
“other” in my environment? This seems just as riddled with presumption, saddling otherness 
with the primary characteristic of disempowerment and reducing a whole identity to who I am 
not. Anyway, some traditional femininities do achieve power: for example, the “Lady” over the 
servant.  
 Bornstein may be onto something, though, with her qualified definition of the transsexual 
as “anyone whose performance of gender calls into question the construct of gender itself” (42), 
a concept akin to queerness. “Queer,” which “loosely connotes sexualities and genderings 
without pinpointing single and stable, specific, homo/hetero sexualities and genderings” 
(Morrison, 11; qtd. Slagle, 86) has come to the forefront of identity politics through embrace of a 
collective identity not based on unitary identity. Guerilla activists Queer Nation transcend 
essentialism by emphasizing members as “similar because they are different” (87), allowing for 
not only the “unfixing” of gender and sex identities, but class-based, ethnic, and national 
identities too.  
 
Maybe I’m…. No…. Nevermind. 
   After all this naming and renaming, I remain inconclusive.  
 Appropriately so. 
 
Kristeva advises we “steer between stable identities/positions” (Oliver, 107). Simone de 
Beauvoir, all those years ago, anticipated this debate when she suggested we provide ourselves 
coherent identity without finalization or closure (Vintges, 139). Particularly useful to critic Toril 
Moi is Beauvoir’s concept of the body as a situation, and of “lived experience, [which,] she 
would say, is an open-ended, ongoing interaction between the subject and the world, where each 
term continuously constructs the other” (56). Moi reminds us that post-structuralists specifically 
and feminists in general are missing out when overlooking Beauvoir, who “never forgets that one 
of the many possible answers to the question ‘What is a woman?’ is ‘a human being’” (8). 
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How many times in the 1980s—a “gender freak” on the street, a-strut or full-sneak—did I 
hear that publicly-announced question: “What in the hell is that?” I internalized that question, 
asked God, asked psychoanalysis, asked gay culture, asked feminism for an answer, a name. But 
as soon as I re-formulated this question I was caught up again in a patriarchal pursuit: for the 
crown of the “real me”: that titled myth with the mononuclear name. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Actually, Kate Bush in 1978 claimed to identify more with male musicians. Female rock 
pioneers like Bush, Chrissie Hynde of the Pretenders, Patti Smith, and Joan Armatrading “were 
venturing into uncharted territory, and pretty much the only models available to them were male. 
To make an impression at all, they had to imitate male rebels and define themselves against the 
‘limitations’ of femininity” (Reynolds and Price, 236). These artists were far from anti-female, 
but feminine equaled sweet and lyrical, a restriction according to Bush who wanted to write 
songs that intrude and interrogate (240-241). Avant-garde storyteller Laurie Anderson often 
distorted her voice into an electronic androgyny, and Grace Jones sang that she felt like a woman 
and looked like a man (a demolition man!), naming her postmodern cabaret One Man Show 
“punning on both her androgynous looks and on the fact that there was no single, no real, Grace 
Jones” (292). See The Sex Revolts: Gender, Rebellion and Rock’n’Roll by Simon Reynolds and 
Joy Press (1995). These ideas will surface at various points throughout the essay.  
2. I am quoting dolphin-spirit channeler Neville Rowe in Tom Corboy’s trickily satiric 
documentary about the New Age movement The New Believers (1990). Both Rowe and a 
dubious healer named Master Ho dwell intensely on childhoods brutalized by hyper-masculine 
fathers and school bullies; regardless of the legitimacy of their New Age careers, their telling of 
personal empowerment is poignant.    
3. In “Narrating Ourselves: Duped or Duplicitous?” (1997), Karen Nakuma critiques a primary 
theme in transsexual narratives: transsexuals as “women trapped in men’s bodies.” In 
“attempting to stand outside the sex/gender system, they are still defined by it” (84), Nakuma 
explains, and, as well, the narratives reinforce “the notion that transsexual women are 
handmaidens to the medical community” (75).  
4. As for “reading like a woman”: Elaine Showalter, though I did not read her until much later, 
might have suggested I was reading as a feminist (CC, 126). 
5. In the essay “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Men, Women, and Masculinity” (2002), 
Halberstam says that masculinity need not be read “as the powerful and active alternative to 
female passivity and as the expression therefore of white male subjectivities” (345) [my 
emphasis].  
6. Another false given: with heterosexuality as the norm and homosexuality the fixated-on 
anomaly, bisexuality is rendered more or less invisible.  
7. Robert Stoller and Richard Green, classic “mother-blamers,” were considered pioneers. In the 
1970s, Green became the principal analyst for the UCLA Feminine Boys Project. His “landmark 
work” The ‘Sissy Boy Syndrome’ and the Development of Homosexuality (1987) equated 
childhood cross-gender expression with pre-homosexual orientation. It was on Dateline that he 
quipped, “Barbies at five. Sleeps with men at twenty-five.”       
8. Attfield: “There is enough evidence to suggest that much could be learnt were we to study 
how children subvert the ready-made meanings inserted into toys by manufacturers” (86).  
9. Like 1980s feminism was accused of not speaking for all “women” but for middle-class white 
women. 
10. Though Bornstein—a male-to-female transsexual—disdains androgyny for the binary it 
supports by its position in the middle, some critics wonder if sexual reassignment in and of itself 
can be interpreted as so complicit. One reviewer of Gender Outlaw asks, then, “If the problem of 
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gender identity lies in its social construction, why is the problem even addressed through ‘penile 
inversion,’ vaginoplasty, estrogen and progesterone?” (McCann, 21). The question takes us back 
to endnote 3, and then back to 1979, to the sound but unfortunately harsh Janice Raymond who, 
like the more fair-minded Toril Moi, thinks we’re “strait-jacketed” by the sex/gender binary. 
Raymond argues that transsexuals are “uniquely restricted by patriarchy’s definitions of 
masculinity and femininity” thus “body-bound by them” (70) and accuses the medical-
psychiatric establishment of reinforcing sex-role stereotypes by “transforming transsexual bodies 
into the desired sex and instructing them in the rudiments of cultural femininity and masculinity” 
(74). To me, the transformation of bodies rings with possibility, but the assimilative gender-
training to which those bodies are submitted reeks of hypocrisy.  
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